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One Path for "Post-Racial" Employment
Discrimination Cases-The Implicit
Association Test Research As Social
Framework Evidence
Tanya Katerf Herndndezt
To create new norms, you have to understand people's existing
norms and barriers to change. You have to understand what's
getting in their way.
The 50th Anniversary of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 finds
the status of civil rights in the United States at a critical juncture.
The formal edifice of a civil rights structure precariously stands
amidst the erosion of substantive rights for victims of
discrimination by a conservative Supreme Court majority
increasingly suspicious of any civil rights claims that do not
emanate from disgruntled "reverse discrimination" narratives.
Today's legal civil rights struggle is in large measure the effort to
retain the foundational premise that racial discrimination is still a
pervasive and problematic dynamic that the law should be
engaged in addressing. In short, the biggest battle for civil rights
attorneys today is operating within a civil rights structure that
makes it increasingly difficult for any plaintiff (other than "reverse
discrimination" plaintiffs) to lodge a triable case of discrimination.
Modern civil rights doctrine now approaches racial discrimination
as an exceptional occurrence for which plaintiffs must navigate a
treacherous obstacle course of evidentiary burdens.
Within the employment discrimination context, the attempt
to salvage anti-discrimination law doctrine has been lodged on
several fronts.2 Of particular note has been the effort to
t. Professor of Law, Fordham University School of Law. It is with much
appreciation that I extend thanks to Melissa Hart, Jerry Kang, Paul Secunda, John
Valery White, and Michael Zimmer, for reading an earlier draft of this Article. I
also am also grateful to my able Research Assistants Marc Castaneda, Simranjit
Singh, and Amanda Yu. Any shortcomings are my own.
1. Atul Gawande, Slow Ideas, THE NEW YORKER (July 29, 2013),
http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2013/07/29/130729fa-fact-gawande?currentPa
ge=all (discussing why some medical innovations spread swiftly and others slowly).
2. E.g., Noah D. Zatz, Introduction: Working Group on the Future of Systemic
Disparate Treatmient Law, 32 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 387, 387 (2011).
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incorporate "social framework" evidence. Social framework
evidence refers to general social science research results used to
construct a frame of reference or background context for deciding
factual issues crucial to the resolution of a specific case.3 The
primary appeal of social framework evidence is that it offers the
potential to more accurately situate a specific case of
discrimination against a backdrop understanding of how
discrimination actually operates, which can better assist a fact
finder in identifying the manifestations of discrimination.4
Yet, given the powerful societal conviction in a "post-racial"
America narrative of discrimination as an exceptionally rare event
caused by aberrant malicious individuals, general social
framework evidence alone will be unlikely to assist most plaintiffs
in presenting a persuasive case of discrimination. This is because
general social framework evidence alone does not address the
principal barrier to change that exists for many fact finders-the
entrenched belief that discrimination is only caused by
intentionally "racist" individuals who are much fewer in number
now that Jim Crow segregation has long been dismantled. With
this constrained view of discrimination as aberrational and
consciously motivated as the social norm, any plaintiff accounts
that deviate from this larger societal narrative will be met with
resistance that general social framework evidence is likely
impotent against. What is needed is a legal tool that can directly
speak to the larger societal narrative in ways that assist fact
finders to better understand contemporary manifestations of
discrimination.
This Article proposes that the use of general social
framework evidence specifically incorporate detailed information
about the burgeoning social psychology literature regarding
"implicit bias," and, in particular, the Implicit Association Test
(IAT) designed to detect the extent of an individual's implicit
3. Laurens Walker & John Monahan, Social Frameworks: A New Use of Social
Science in Law, 73 VA. L. REV. 559, 570 (1987) ("We therefore propose a new
category, which we term social framework, to refer to the use of general conclusions
from social science research in determining factual issues in a specific case.").
4. E.g., John Monahan et al., Contextual Evidence of Gender Discrimination:
The Ascendance of "Social Frameworks," 94 VA. L. REV. 1715, 1729 (2008) (citing
State v. Alger, 764 P.2d 119, 127-28 (Idaho Ct. App. 1988) ("A novel role for
empirical research is emerging-a use of general research conclusions to set a
background context for deciding crucial factual issues at trial.")).
5. See Sumi Cho, Post-Racialism, 94 IOWA L. REV. 1589, 1597-98 (2009).
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biases.' Implicit bias is a type of discrimination that originates in
unconscious mental processes that systematically distort the way
we see other people.' Studies have shown that even the most
"well-meaning" person, who explicitly rejects all kinds of
discrimination, unwittingly allows unconscious thoughts and
feelings, which usually contain some degree of bias, to influence
their objective decisions.! Indeed, a number of scholars have
pointed to the importance of considering implicit bias as a
justification for reforming the doctrinal contours and standards of
employment discrimination claims.9 This Article recommends that
6. See Anthony G. Greenwald et al., Measuring Individual Differences in
Implicit Cognition: The Implicit Association Test, 74 J. PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. 1464, 1465-66 (1998) (providing a model for administration of the IAT).
7. Barbara Reskin, Unconsciousness Raising: The Pernicious Effects of
Unconscious Biasing, 14 REGIONAL REv. 33, 33-34 (2005).
8. See Mahzarin R. Banaji et al., How (Un) Ethical Are You?, HARV. Bus. REV.,
Dec. 2003, at 58 ("Because implicit prejudice arises from the ordinary and
unconscious tendency to make associations, it is distinct from conscious forms of
prejudice, such as overt racism or sexism.").
9. E.g., Samuel R. Bagenstos, Implicit Bias, "Science," and Antidiscrimination
Law, 1 HARV. L. & POL'Y REV. 477 (2007); Ivan E. Bodensteiner, The Implications of
Psychological Research Related to Unconscious Discrimination and Implicit Bias in
Proving Intentional Discrimination, 73 Mo. L. REV. 83 (2008); Emma Reece Denny,
Mo' Claims Mo' Problems: How Courts Ignore Multiple Claimants in Employment
Discrimination Litigation, 30 LAw & INEQ. 339 (2012), David L. Faigman et al., A
Matter of Fit: The Law of Discrimination and the Science of Implicit Bias, 59
HASTINGS L.J. 1389 (2008); Tristin K Green, A Structural Approach as
Antidiscrimination Mandate: Locating Employer Wrong, 60 VAND. L. REV. 849
(2007); Anthony G. Greenwald & Linda Hamilton Krieger, Implicit Bias: Scientific
Foundations, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 945 (2006); Melissa Hart, Subiective
Decisionmaking and Unconscious Discrimination, 56 ALA. L. REV. 741 (2005);
David Hausman, How Congress Could Reduce Job Discrimination by Promoting
Anonymous Hiring. 64 STAN. L. REV. 1343 (2012); Linda Hamilton Krieger & Susan
T. Fiske, Behavioral Realism in Employment Discrimination Law: Implicit Bias
and Disparate Treatment, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 997 (2006); Linda Hamilton Krieger,
The Content of Our Categories: A Cognitive Bias Approach to Discrimination and
Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1161 (1995); Justin D. Levinson,
Forgotten Racial Equality: Implicit Bias, Decisionmaking, and Misremembering, 57
DuKE L.J. 345 (2007); Natalie Bucciarelli Pedersen, A Legal Framework for
Uncovering Implicit Bias, 79 U. CIN. L. REV. 97 (2010); Deana A. Pollard,
Unconscious Bias and Self-Critical Analysis: The Case for a Qualified Evidentiary
Equal Employment Opportunity Privilege, 74 WASH. L. REV. 913 (1999); Patrick S.
Shin, Liability for Unconscious Discrimination? A Thought Experiment in the
Theory of Employment Discrimination Law, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 67 (2010); Franita
Tolson, The Boundaries of Litigating Unconscious Discrimination: Firm-Based
Remedies in Response to a Hostile Judiciary, 33 DEL. J. CORP. L. 347 (2008); Jeffrey
A. Van Detta, "Le Roi Est Mort; Vive Le Roi!": An Essay on the Quiet Demise of
McDonnell Douglas and the Transformation of Every Title VII Case After Desert
Palace, Inc. v. Costa into a "Mixed-Motives" Case, 52 DRAKE L. REV. 71 (2003); Joan
C. Williams & Stephanie Bornstein, The Evolution of "FReD": Family
Responsibilities Discrimination and Developments in the Law of Stereotyping and
Implicit Bias, 59 HASTINGS L.J. 1311 (2008); Boyd Byers, Freakonomics, The
Weakest Link, And Implicit Bias, 13 KAN. EMP. L. LETTER 7 (2006); Nancy Gertner,
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in the absence of such doctrinal reform, the presentation of social
framework evidence needs to explicitly include the details of
implicit bias research and the IAT, in an effort to provide an
effective plaintiff account of discrimination that responds to the
confusion created for fact finders by today's social norms.
Thus far, employment discrimination lawyers have been
largely reticent introducing detailed implicit bias research out of
concern that judges would view it as too amorphous and
attenuated to fit the current employment discrimination
jurisprudence.'0 Indeed, leading civil rights organizations have
been urging plaintiffs' lawyers "to present this evidence in court to
establish that implicit bias is the catalyst of discriminatory
injustices in this day and age."" The main focus of this Article is
to address the reticence of plaintiffs' lawyers that has hindered the
consideration of implicit bias research in employment
discrimination cases thus far.
While the law review literature has already amply noted that
social framework evidence encompasses a broad array of social
science research evidence which can include, but is not limited to,
implicit bias research, this Article distinctively proposes: 1) that
social framework evidence be more broadly introduced into
employment discrimination cases beyond the current practice of
bringing forth expert witness testimony to explain the social
psychology of stereotyping when stereotyped perspectives are
concretely manifested in the workplace, and 2) that specific details
about the insights drawn from the implicit association testing
research be included. In short, this Article proposes a litigation
strategy that can more effectively elucidate the operation of
discrimination in the absence of overt articulations of
stereotyping, by introducing detailed implicit bias research as a
backdrop for assessing when disparities in treatment, status,
access, or opportunity are the result of discrimination despite the
absence of overt stereotyping. To the extent that employment
Losers' Rules, 122 YALE L.J. ONLINE 109 (2012), available at
http://yalelawiournal.orthe-yale-law- iournal-pocket-
part/procedurelosers%E2%80%99-rules/.
10. See, e.g., Maurice Wexler, Kate Bogard, Julie Totten, & Lauri Damrell,
Implicit Bias and Employment Law: A Voyage into the Unknown, 41 BNA DAILY
LAB. REP. I-1, March 1, 2013, at 4, available at httpJ/www.orrick.com/Events-and-
Publications/Documents/orrick-wexler-bogard-totten-damrell.pdf ("[Ilmplicit bias
evidence has no place in the current legal framework").
11. Eva Paterson, Litigating Implicit Bias, POVERTY & RACE (Poverty & Race
Res. Council), Sept.Oct. 2011, available at
http//www.prrac.org/full-text.php?text-id=1365&itemid=13243&newsletter-id=1
19&header-Race+%2F+Racism&kc=1.
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discrimination lawyers have been reticent introducing detailed
implicit bias research and judges have been equally cautious about
admitting such evidence, this Article provides guidance as to how
to incorporate this evidence into the existing employment
discrimination jurisprudence.
Section I will introduce the contours of social framework
evidence and explain why the present "post-racial" narrative about
discrimination requires that detailed information about the social
psychology of implicit bias be inserted into a social framework
proffer. Section II will then concretely explain how detailed
implicit bias testing data can inform social framework evidence.
Section III will explore the receptivity of current case law to
implicit bias social framework evidence, and Section IV will
conclude with a specific case example of how detailed implicit bias
social framework evidence can be applied to aid fact finders in
more accurately assessing allegations of employment
discrimination.
I. Why the Post-Racial Context Needs Detailed Implicit
Bias Testing Research Data
When the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was enacted, there was no
particular need for litigants to import social framework evidence,
let alone detailed implicit bias data. Newspapers and the televised
evening news were replete with concrete images of the reality of
the violence of racial segregation and the relevance of race in how
society was structured.12 Indeed, McDonnell Douglas Corp. v.
Green "encapsulated the century of struggle that led up to the
successor of another assassinated President signing
antidiscrimination legislation into law."13 The social context of the
time provided every discrimination case with an immediate social
framework for processing claims, and an understanding that
circumstantial evidence of discrimination was sufficient in the
absence of a defendant's legal justification for differential
treatment, status, access, or opportunity. No overt statements of
12. See ANIKO BODROGHKOZY, EQUAL TIME (2012) (exploring the crucial role of
network television in reconfiguring attitudes about race relations during the civil
rights movement and unmistakably influencing the ongoing movement for African
American empowerment, desegregation, and equality); GENE ROBERTS & HANK
KILBANOFF, THE RACE BEAT (2006) (detailing how news stories, editorials, and
photographs in the American press profoundly changed the nation's thinking about
civil rights in the South during the 1950s and 60s).
13. Jeffrey A. Van Detta, Requiem for a Heavyweight: Costa as
Countermonument to McDonnell Douglas-A Countermemory Reply to
Instrumentalism, 67 ALB. L. REV. 965, 971 n.31 (discussing Green v. McDonnell
Douglas Corp., 463 F.2d 337 (8th Cir. 1972)).
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discriminatory intent were required because the social reality
filled in the explanatory gap between the lack of an employer
justification and the conclusion that differential treatment, status,
access, or opportunity was indicative of discrimination. The social
context of the reality of racism was the metaphorical glue that
connected differential status and the absence of a
nondiscriminatory employer justification into a structure
identified as "discrimination."
But with the dismantlement of visible Jim Crow segregation
and the cessation in television film coverage of massive physical
brutality against scores of African Americans, the reality of racism
became more attenuated for those not directly affected by it. The
formal access to education and the labor market for certain
segments of communities of color also created an impression that
the legacy of racism was behind us. Over time, many judges and
juries came to discrimination claims without the metaphorical
glue of a conviction in the reality of racism. At the same time, the
conservative majority of the Supreme Court employed what Ian
Haney-L6pez terms "intentional blindness" to purposely undercut
the jurisprudential ability to locate triable claims of
discrimination. 1
Thus, at present even the most well-intentioned of fact
finders can find themselves struggling to ferret out space in the
antidiscrimination doctrine to make sense of the discrimination
claims that are presented. It is not so much that the nature of
discrimination has completely changed, but that the social norms
for identifying discrimination have changed. Today the "post-
racial" social norm is that racism is an aberration instigated by
consciously malicious individuals." With that as the norm for
identifying discrimination, fact finders feel constrained from
connecting racial disparity and an employer's flimsy or absent
justification for the disparity with a finding of discrimination."
14. Ian Haney-L6pez, "Intentional Blindness," 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1779, 1861
(2012) ("Intentional blindness, not intentional ignorance, more aptly characterizes
the racial jurisprudence of the Supreme Court's conservatives. They seem to
understand that racism is a pervasive problem, yet oppose the courts and the
Constitution to contribute to the solution.").
15. Cho, supra note 5, at 1597-98 (defining post-racialism as a rhetoric that
contends that racism has already been largely transcended).
16. E.g., Michael Selmi, Theorizing Systemic Disparate Treatment Law: After
Wal-Mart v. Dukes, 32 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 477, 480-81, 492 (2011)
(predicting that after Dukes, courts will require a "narrative of discrimination" to
justify a claim of systemic discrimination because of the modern absence of a
presumption that statistical disparity is automatically explained as
discrimination).
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What is needed is a new form of metaphorical glue. Social
framework evidence that presents the details of the social
psychology data about implicit bias testing might be able to serve
that role.
Many courts already readily admit general social framework
evidence. Legal scholars Laurens Walker and John Monahan
describe social framework evidence as the admission of empirical
information to construct a frame of reference for deciding factual
issues." While this is a form of judicial notice that is of neither
legislative facts nor adjudicative facts as contemplated in Federal
Rules of Evidence Rule 201," "a growing number of courts have
held that the use of social frameworks to correct beliefs that are
erroneous does indeed 'assist the trier of fact.'"" This is because
the Federal Rules of Evidence do not bar the use of social science
in this manner,20 thereby allowing a court to admit empirical
information "to keep it responsive to its changing environment."2
Judges customarily admit empirical information through the
use of expert witnesses for the purpose of assisting a trier of fact to
understand the evidence.22 In fact, within the employment
discrimination context experts are commonly used in a number of
ways.23 Experts providing testimony on the deployment of racial
stereotypes in the workplace bear the burden of disabusing fact
finders of what they believe is "common sense."2 4 In addition,
social framework evidence has also been deployed in
discrimination claims to elucidate the role of unchecked
17. Walker & Monahan, supra note 3, at 570 (defining social framework as the
use of general conclusions from social science research in determining factual
issues in a specific case).
18. FED. R. EVID. 201 (judicial notice of adjudicative facts).
19. Walker & Monahan, supra note 3, at 580.
20. Id. at 582.
21. E.F. Roberts, Preliminary Notes Toward a Study of Judicial Notice, 52
CORNELL L. REV. 210, 210 (1967) (describing the role of judicial notice in the
successful operation of the common law).
22. See Walker & Monahan, supra note 3, at 583 (referring to the admission of
social science evidence by expert testimony).
23. Brian L. McDermott & Susanna P. Mroz, The Use of Experts in Employment
Discrimination Litigation, THE FEDERAL LAWYER, June 2011, at 20, available at
http://www.fedbar.org/federal-lawyer-magazine/2011/june/columns/labor-
employment-corner.pdf.
24. See KENT SPRIGGS, REPRESENTING PLAINTIFFS IN TITLE VII ACTIONS 14-28,
§ 17.03[3][g] (2d ed. Supp. 2005); see also Tanya Kateri Herndndez, Employment
Discrimination in the Ethnically Diverse Workplace, 49 JUDGES' J. 33, 35 (2010),
available at http/ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1013&context
=faculty scholarship.
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subjectivity in biased decision-making as discussed in Wal-Mart
Stores, Inc. v. Dukes.
While this is a case narrative that can describe how
unconscious biases are allowed to fester with unchecked
managerial subjectivity, thus far litigants have not directly
integrated the details about the social psychology data on implicit
association testing bias. In fact, neither the plaintiffs briefs nor
the amicus curiae briefs submitted in Dukes included detailed
implicit bias research in their presentations.2 6 While the plaintiffs
expert witness reports and testimony made a number of general
references to it being "widely accepted that stereotypes are social
categories that are available to us and are invoked in cognition,
whether we're aware of it or not, "2 the record did not include any
specifics about implicit association testing research." This
absence was probably a result of the plaintiffs understanding, as
articulated in its brief before the Supreme Court,2 9 that precedent
25. See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011).
26. See Brief for Respondents, Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541
(2011) (No. 10-277); Brief for the ACLU and National Women's Law Center, et al.
as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents, Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541 (No. 10-277);
Brief for American Sociological Association and the Law and Society Association as
Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents, Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541 (No. 10-277); Brief
for Civil Procedure Professors as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents, Dukes,
131 S. Ct. 2541 (No. 10-277); Brief for Consumers Union of United States, Inc.,
National Consumer Law Center, and Center for Constitutional Rights as Amici
Curiae Supporting Respondents, Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541 (No. 10-277); Brief for the
Institute For Women's Policy Research as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents,
Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541 (No. 10-277); Brief for Labor Economists and Statisticians
as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents, Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541 (No. 10-277);
Brief for Law and Economics Professors as Amicus Curiae Supporting
Respondents, Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541 (No. 10-277); Brief of NAACP Legal Defense
and Educational Fund, Inc., et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents, Dukes,
131 S. Ct. 2541 (No. 10-277); Brief for National Employment Lawyers Association,
the Equal Justice Society, and the Legal Aid Society-Employment Law Center as
Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents, Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541 (No. 10-277); Brief
for Public Citizen, Inc., as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents, Dukes, 131 S.
Ct. 2541 (No. 10-277); Brief for Public Justice, P.C., the National Association of
Consumer Advocates and the National Consumers League as Amici Curiae
Supporting Respondents, Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541 (No. 10-277); Brief of the United
Food and Commercial Workers International Union et al. as Amici Curiae
Supporting Respondents, Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541 (No. 10-277); Brief for U.S.
Women's Chamber of Commerce, National Partnership for Women & Families, and
California Women Lawyers as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents, Dukes, 131
S. Ct. 2541 (No. 10-277).
27. Deposition of William T. Bielby at 71, Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 222
F.R.D. 137 (N.D. Cal. 2004) (No. C-01-2252).
2& See id. Furthermore, any plaintiff-lawyer interest in introducing the details
of implicit bias research would have necessitated a social psychologist expert
witness in addition to the expertise of an esteemed sociologist like William Bielby.
29. Brief for Respondents at 36-37, Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541 (No. 10-277).
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had long established the relevance of gender stereotyping research
in discrimination cases such as Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins.30
Furthermore, Price Waterhouse's validation of the relevance of
stereotyping for discrimination claims provided little guidance as
to how to analyze stereotypes as evidence and no information
about the science of implicit bias.
Unfortunately, after the Supreme Court's 2011 decision in
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes,32 regarding the evidentiary
guidelines for having a class action certified, the terrain for using
social framework evidence may have been narrowed." Despite the
fact that the case was directly about class action procedures, and
only indirectly about substantive antidiscrimination law, Justice
Scalia's majority opinion expressed great skepticism about
judicially considering more than general social science research
summaries, such as when experts seek to apply the general social
science research to specific case facts and thereby opine on the
30. See 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
31. See id. at 256 ("It takes no special training to discern sex
stereotyping.. . ."); see also Kerri Lynn Stone, Clarifying Stereotyping, 59 U. KAN.
L. REv. 591, 599 (2011) (describing how the Supreme Court's poor guidance has
lead to a legacy of inconsistency in lower courts' determinations as to when an
allegation of discrimination supported by a claim of stereotyping should reach a
trier of fact).
32. 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011). In Dukes, past and present female employees of
Wal-Mart sought to uphold their certification as a class action under Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure 23(a) and (b)(2). Id. at 2547. They alleged, in particular, that
their local managers' discretion over pay and promotions was exercised
disproportionately in favor of men, leading to an unlawful disparate impact on
female employees. Id. at 2548 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)). The crux of the
claim for class action status was that the discrimination the women faced, in light
of this subjective decision-making policy, was common to all Wal-Mart's female
employees. Id. The Court majority concluded that there was not significant proof
that Wal-Mart operated under a general policy of discrimination common to all the
proposed class members. Id. at 2557-58. The proffered evidence of commonality
was deemed insufficient because a corporate policy of allowing discretion by local
supervisors over employment matters is not ipso facto discrimination in an
employer of Wal-Mart's large size, where "it is quite unbelievable that all managers
would exercise their discretion in a common way without some common direction."
Id. at 2554-55. In addition, the Court unanimously concluded that the claims for
backpay were improper under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 23(b)(2), on the
basis that "the monetary relief is not incidental to the injunctive or declaratory
relief." Id. at 2557. The Court was unwilling to "authorize class certification when
each individual class member would be entitled to a different injunction or
declaratory judgment against the defendant" or "when each class member would be
entitled to an individualized award of monetary damages." Id.
33. See Elizabeth M. Schneider & Nancy Gertner, "Only Procedural": Thoughts
on the Substantive Law Dimensions of Preliminary Procedural Decisions in
Employment Discrimination Cases, 57 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 767, 771 (2012/13)
("[Tihe majority's findings not only raised the bar for class action treatment, but
also effectively recharacterized gender law in the workplace.").
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likelihood of discrimination.3 ' Deborah Weiss describes this as the
contrast between the Court's acceptance of a "pure social
framework" and its seeming rejection of an "applied social
framework" exemplified by Justice Scalia's statement:
[Plaintiffs expert Dr. Bielby] could not, however, "determine
with any specificity how regularly stereotypes play a
meaningful role in employment decisions at Wal-Mart. At his
deposition ... Dr. Bielby conceded that he could not calculate
whether 0.5 [%] or 95[%] of the employment decisions at Wal-
Mart might be determined by stereotyped thinking.". . . [This]
is the essential question on which respondents' theory of
commonality depends. If Bielby admittedly has no answer to
that question, we can safely disregard what he has to say.
Justice Scalia's rejection of the relevance of Dr. Bielby's
testimony suggests that litigants may now be limited to general
social framework evidence where, for instance, an expert explains
the general social science research on the operation of stereotyping
and bias in discretionary decision-making. For several decades,
courts have accepted such general social framework evidence in
employment litigation as it provides a general context for the fact
finder to interpret the legal meaning of presented facts.36 What
Dukes now calls into question is the further ability of experts to
directly link general social science findings to an employer's
specific workplace policies.
Some scholars suggest that such links between social science
findings and an employer's workplace policies should only be made
when an expert has conducted his or her own empirical research in
that particular workplace, while others suggest that Dukes's
restriction on social science evidence might be limited to the
context of class action certifications, where specificity is now
needed to allege commonality of class claims.: Indeed, Justice
34. See Dukes, 131 S. Ct. at 2555.
35. Deborah M. Weiss, The Impossibility of Agnostic Discrimination Law, 2011
UTAH L. REV. 1677, 1685-86 (2011) (quoting Dukes, 131 S. Ct. at 2553-54 (first
alteration in original) (citation omitted)).
36. See Melissa Hart & Paul M. Secunda, A Matter of Context: Social
Framework Evidence in Employment Discrimination Class Actions, 78 FORDHAM L.
REV. 37, 39 (2009) (explaining the use of social framework expert testimony and its
role in employment discrimination litigation, especially in the class action context).
37. E.g., John Monahan et al., supra note 4, at 1736-42 (claiming that experts
who link findings from empirical academic studies to behaviors in a particular case
do not apply the same level of "intellectual rigor" that was used to produce the
study from which they extrapolate).
38. E.g., Megan Whitehill, Better Safe than Subjective: The Problematic
Intersection of Pre-Hire Social Networking Checks and Title VII Employment
Discrimination, 85 TEMP. L. REV. 229, 263 (2012) (speculating that after Dukes a
single plaintiff could introduce expert testimony on such social science evidence, in
318 [Vol. 32:309
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Scalia's discussion of social framework evidence says nothing
about how it can be relevant in discrimination cases.39  His
skepticism that social framework evidence does not prove
discrimination overlooks the true purpose of social framework
evidence, which merely seeks to provide context within which a
fact finder can examine the evidence to then decide whether there
was discrimination. In short, Dukes says nothing relevant about
how social framework evidence is properly used to present a case
of discrimination. 40  Furthermore, subsequent to the Dukes
decision, other litigants have had success in having a class
certified based on social framework evidence.4 ' Nevertheless,
while the full ramifications of the Dukes decision will take time to
develop, there is a deep concern that the decision is likely to result
in greater judicial scrutiny of social science evidence.
Unfortunately, the possible post-Dukes chill on using applied
social framework evidence means that fact finders may be left at a
loss for understanding the relevance of the general social
framework to the specific case before them.
Yet standing alone, general social framework evidence about
the vulnerability of subjective decision-making to the operation of
stereotyping can still leave fact finders grasping for what meaning
it should have in a particular case. For instance, in Dukes, Justice
Scalia was perturbed that the social framework evidence
submitted regarding how a strong corporate culture of unfettered
subjective managerial decision-making made it vulnerable to
gender bias could not, in turn, "determine with any specificity how
regularly stereotypes play a meaningful role in employment
decisions at Wal-Mart."4 2 While Justice Scalia's exhortation for
exacting precision in asserting how often stereotyping occurs in a
workplace may never be possible in workplaces where employers
that the testifying expert witness would not need to indicate with statistical
specificity how regularly such discriminatory motivation occurs, because there is no
need to prove commonality and that the testimony's inability to offer statistical
specificity would go to its persuasiveness).
39. See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2553-54 (2011)
(referring to Dr. Bielby's social framework analysis).
40. But see David L. Faigman et al., Group to Individual (G2i) Inference in
Scientific Expert Testimony, 81 U. CHi. L. REV. (forthcoming 2014), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfin?abstractid=2298909# (proposing different
admissibility standards for expert testimony depending on whether experts are
proffering framework evidence to describe general scientific propositions as opposed
to diagnostic evidence to apply the general propositions to individual cases).
41. McReynolds v. Merrill Lynch, No. 05C6583, 2012 WL 5278555 (N.D. Ill.
July 13, 2012) (granting class certification in a disparate impact racial
discrimination case).
42. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. at 2553.
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do not repeatedly verbalize their stereotyped perspectives, the
research on implicit association testing does quantify how
pervasive implicit racial bias can be across a society.4 3 Informing
fact finders about the details of implicit association testing and
what it reveals about how much implicit racial bias is infused in
our social order may enhance the ability of fact finders to more
readily identify how the facts before them could involve race-based
differentiation in the midst of seeming race neutrality in ways that
evidence regarding subjective decision-making alone is no longer
always able to do.
II. Filling in the Contemporary Explanatory Gap: Detailed
Implicit Bias Research and Testing As Social
Framework Evidence
Research in the field of social psychology reveals that
individuals rely on implicit attitudes to process information and
have biases that they do not know they have." Implicit attitudes
are positive or negative evaluations of some concept (person, place,
thing, or idea) that occur outside of a person's awareness and
control." These implicit attitudes, as psychologists call them, are
picked up over a lifetime, absorbed from our culture, and work
automatically to color our perceptions and influence our choices."
When those implicit attitudes attribute particular qualities to
members of a specific social category, they are then implicit
stereotypes. Most people do not see their own implicit bias,
which can appear spontaneously as intuition, a gut feeling, or a
43. Compare id. at 2554 (saying there is no "significant proof" that an employer
"operated under a general policy of discrimination" without specificity of how often
stereotyped thinking determines employment decisions), with Stephen M. Rich,
Against Prejudice, 80 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1, 24 (2011) (pointing out that
experiments like the IAT provide a "concrete measure by which to assess the
influence of implicit biases on behavior").
44. See Russell H. Fazio et al., Attitude Accessibility, Attitude-Behavior
Consistency, and the Strength of the Object-Evaluation Association, 18 J.
EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL., 339, 341 (1982) (an attitude "is an association
between a given object and a given evaluative category"); Robert B. Zajonc, Feeling
and Thinking: Preferences Need No Inferences, 35 AM. PSYCHOL. 151 (1980) (noting
that humans can control the way emotions are expressed, but not the fact that they
exist).
45. See Anthony Greenwald & Mahzarin Banaji, Implicit Social Cognition:
Attitudes, Self-Esteem, and Stereotypes, 102 PSYCHOL. REV. 4, 7 (1995)
46. See Krieger, supra note 9, at 1199-1200 (describing the relationship
between implicit bias and schemas).
47. Greenwald & Banaji, supra note 45, at 14.
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vague doubt about a person. 4 8 This is why discriminatory actions
rooted in racial implicit bias are also referred to as "unconscious
racism" by some legal scholars.
In 1998, the scientific literature introduced an IAT designed
to detect the extent of an individual's implicit biases.5 0 Thereafter,
a massive study called Project Implicit has used a simple online
version of the IAT to measure the pervasiveness of implicit social
bias.1 "The project, housed jointly at the University of Virginia,
Harvard University[,] and the University of Washington, collects
20,000 responses a week-and hundreds of researchers are using
its data to predict how people will behave based on their
unconscious prejudices."" The project is funded in part by the
National Institute of Mental Health and the National Science
Foundation.53
Project Implicit's online IAT studies how quickly individuals
"associate a group of people, shown in photographs, with either
positive or negative words."54 The IAT is rooted in the very simple
hypothesis that people will find it easier to associate pleasant
words with faces and names of socially favored groups than with
socially disfavored group faces and names." Ease of association,
measured by judgment speed, is taken as evidence for an
implicitly-held attitude toward that social group." There are IAT
tests that measure implicit bias regarding gender, sexuality,
religion, Arab-Muslims, disability, age, weight, skin-tone, and
race." Once the test is completed, test-takers receive ratings like
48. Id. at 8 ("implicit attitudes are introspectively unidentified (or inaccurately
identified) traces of past experiences that mediate favorable or unfavorable feeling,
thought, or action toward social objects.").
49. E.g., Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection:
Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317, 323 (1987).
50. Greenwald et al., supra note 6.
51. PROJECT IMPLICIT, https://implicit.harvard.edulimplicit (last visited Feb. 8,
2014).
52. June Kronholz, How the Unconscious Affects the Truth, WALL ST. J., Aug. 2,
2008, at W6.
53. Id.
54. MAHZARIN R. BANAJI & ANTHONY G. GREENWALD, BLINDSPOT: HIDDEN
BIASES OF GOOD PEOPLE 39 (2013).
55. PROJECT IMPLICIT, https://implicit.harvard.edu/implicit/iatdetails.htm (last
visited Feb. 14, 2014) ("We would say that one has an implicit preference for thin
people relative to fat people if they are faster to categorize words when Thin People
and Good share a response key and Fat People and Bad share a response key,
relative to the reverse.").
56. Id.
57. Sarah E. Redfield, Professor Emerita of Univ. of NH, Beyond Bias:
Deconstructing Stereotypes, Address at the ABA Section of Litigation Annual
Conference 17, Apr. 24-26, 2013, available at
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"neutral," "slight," "moderate," or "strong" preference for a
particular group as a measure of their implicit bias on the subject
tested."' In short, the IAT measures the strength of associations
between concepts like particular racial groups and positive or
negative evaluations or stereotypes about that concept.
The findings from Project Implicit's six million participants
over a decade of testing show that a majority of sampled
Americans have some form of implicit bias."9 The associations are
not randomly oriented but instead are biased in directions that
favor groups higher in the social hierarchy. For instance, with
respect to race, the IAT testing reveals that some 75% of Whites,
Hispanics, and Asians show an unintentional bias for Whites over
Blacks.o In addition, one third of Blacks also show a preference
for Whites over Blacks.61
Yet people are unaware of their implicit biases. Ordinary
people, including the researchers who direct the IAT project, are
found to harbor implicit biases even while honestly "reporting that
they regard themselves as lacking these biases."62 Nevertheless,
implicit biases predict behavior.63 Those who are higher in implicit
bias have been shown to display greater discrimination.6
A number of examples bear this out beyond the context of
reaction time studies of implicit bias with the IAT test. Studies of
the labor market context manifest implicit biases. The studies
show that many Whites who earnestly believe in equal rights will
still recommend hiring a White job candidate more often than a
person with identical credentials who is Black, even where race is
not explicit on a resume but merely suggested by an ethnic-
sounding surname.65 Indeed, White applicants with felony
convictions are often preferred over Black candidates without
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/litigation/materials/sa
c2013/sac_2013/39_beyond-bias.authcheckdam.pdf.
58. The test is available at www.projectimplict.net.
59. See, e.g., Kronholz, supra note 52.
60. See BANAJI & GREENWALD, supra note 54, at 47 & 221 n.6.
61. See id.
62. See Redfield, supra note 57, at 18.
63. BANAJI & GREENWALD, supra note 54, at 47-50; Jonathan Feingold & Karen
Lorang, Defusing Implicit Bias, 59 UCLA L. REV. DiscouRsE 210, 217 (2012).
64. See BANAi & GREENWALD, supra note 54; Tracey G. Gove, Implicit Bias
and Law Enforcement, 78 THE POLICE CHIEF, Oct. 2011, available at
http://www.policechiefmagazine.org/magazine/index.cfm?fuseaction=print-display&
articleid=2499&issue-id=102011.
65. See, e.g., Marianne Bertrand & Sendhil Mullainathan, Are Emily and Greg
More Employable Than Lakisha and Jamal? A Field Experiment on Labor Market
Discrimination, 94 Am. ECON. REV. 991 (2004); see also Nicholas D. Kristof, Racism
Without Racists, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 5, 2008, at WK10.
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prison records.66 In experiments, otherwise identical job applicant
folders presenting the person as either White or Black yield
different results.6 ' The White employer "thinks that he or she is
selecting on the basis of nonracial factors like experience," but in
fact is not.
The pervasiveness of such implicit bias was most recently
manifested in the bankruptcy context. A study of racial disparity
in using a more costly and punitive form of consumer bankruptcy
in Chapter 13 rather than Chapter 7 found that bankruptcy
lawyers are more likely to steer Black debtors into Chapter 13
than White filers, even when they had identical financial profiles.69
In the study, a survey was sent to lawyers asking them questions
based on fictitious couples who were seeking bankruptcy
protection.o When the couple was named "Reggie and Latisha"
and attended an African Methodist Episcopal Church- as opposed
to a White couple, "Todd and Allison," who were members of a
United Methodist Church-the lawyers were more likely to
recommend a more costly Chapter 13 bankruptcy, even though the
two couples' financial circumstances were identical.
Nor are implicit racial biases solely embedded in attitudes
about Blacks. Unconscious stereotypes also arise with respect to
other non-White racial groups. In a study of mock juror
evaluations of litigators taking depositions, jury-eligible adults
took the IAT test and later were shown photographs of a White
lawyer and an Asian lawyer and then listened to two separate
audio tapes of each of those lawyers taking a deposition with the
exact same audio-thus with identical lawyering styles.72 Despite
the identical audio, the mock jurors with IAT biases favoring
Whites submitted evaluations that preferred the White lawyer as
more competent and worth recommending to family and friends,
seemingly based on their implicit stereotypes about Asian
lawyers.
66. Devah Pager, The Mark of a Criminal Record, 108 AM. J. Soc. 937, 960
(2003).
67. Kristof, supra note 64.
68. Id.
69. Jean Braucher, Dov Cohen & Robert M. Lawless, Race, Attorney Influence,
and Bankruptcy Chapter Choice, 9 J. EMPIRIcAL LEGAL STUD. 393, 395 (2012).
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Jerry Kang et al., Are Ideal Litigators White? Measuring the Myth of
Colorblindness, 7 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 886, 896-97 (2010).
73. Id. at 901.
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Similarly, in IAT studies regarding Latinos, participants
were shown to hold the implicit stereotype that Latinos are less
intelligent than Anglo Whites." Furthermore, the greater a
participant's implicit bias against Latino immigrants, the larger
the person's opposition to legal and illegal immigration." In
studies of judges specifically, similar patterns of pervasive implicit
bias were also shown," including judges from various jurisdictions,
both elected and appointed." These findings show that virtually
none of us, despite our best efforts, are free from implicit bias.
Repeated validity tests demonstrate the IAT's psychometric
worthiness.7 ' The validity testing has also shown that the implicit
association test results are more predictive of social behavior than
self-reports of explicit bias. 79  As a result, testimony about the
science of implicit bias is readily admissible as "reliable evidence"
under the Supreme Court's Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals test for the admission of scientific evidence,
because it is grounded in the scientific method with appropriate
testing validation that are related to the legal inquiry into
discrimination.o Since the introduction of the IAT in 1998,
"hundreds of peer-reviewed scientific publications have produced
largely consistent results," indicating that implicit biases are both
pervasive and of a strong statistical magnitude.1
Given the scientific data about the pervasiveness of implicit
bias, a number of commentators recommend using expert
74. James M. Weyant, Implicit Stereotyping of Hispanics: Development and
Validity of a Hispanic Version of the Implicit Association Test, 27 HISP. J. BEHAV.
Sci. 355, 355 (2005).
75. Efrdn 0. Prez, Explicit Evidence on the Import of Implicit Attitudes: The
IAT and Immigration Policy Judgments, 32 POL. BEHAV. 517, 531, 533 (2010).
76. E.g., Jeffrey J. Rachlinski & Sheri Lynn Johnson, Does Unconscious Racial
Bias Affect Trial Judges, 84 NOTRE DAME. L. REV. 1195, 1205-06 (discussing the
results of a study conducted on seventy judges from a large urban jurisdiction in
the eastern U.S., forty-five judges from a large urban jurisdiction in the western
U.S., and a group of eighteen judges who attended an optional session at a regional
judicial education conference).
77. Id. (noting that the judges were all appointed to the bench initially but that
some then stood for reelection).
78. Brian A. Nosek, Anthony G. Greenwald, & Mahzahrin R. Banaji, The
Implicit Association Test at Age 7: A Methodological and Conceptual Review, in
AUTOMATIC PROCESSES IN SOCIAL THINKING AND BEHAVIOR 265, 286 (J. A. Bargh
ed., 2007).
79. See Greenwald & Krieger, supra note 9, at 954.
80. See, e.g., Faigman et al., supra note 9, at 1430-31 (noting that collectively
the empirical studies on implicit bias appear to satisfy the Daubert reliability
requirement).
81. Jerry Kang & Kristin Lane, Seeing Through Colorblindness: Implicit Bias
and the Law, 58 UCLA L. REV. 465, 473 (2010).
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witnesses in discrimination cases to educate the judge and jury
about the nature and pervasiveness of unconscious
discrimination.8 2 Yet this has been discussed primarily with the
objective of finding methods for litigating an "unconscious
discrimination" cause of action. 3 In contrast, this Article instead
focuses on the benefit of incorporating detailed implicit bias
research into all Title VII claims as a framework for more
coherently presenting a narrative of employment discrimination.
In particular, inserting detailed implicit bias research into social
framework evidence is an effective way to respond to fact finder
confusion as to why Justice Scalia's presumption in Dukes, that
"left to their own devices most managers in any corporation-and
surely most managers in a corporation that forbids sex
discrimination-would select sex-neutral, performance-based
criteria for hiring and promotion that produce no actionable
disparity at all,""5 is not accurate.
To be clear, such information would be presented for the sole
purpose of a creating a social framework to construct a frame of
reference for deciding the factual issues, and not as a vehicle for
imparting a general group bias to an individual defendant on the
legal question of discriminatory intent. 86  Nor is this Article
82. See Audrey J. Lee, Unconscious Bias Theory in Employment Discrimination
Litigation, 40 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 481, 496 (2005).
83. See, e.g., id. But see, e.g., Katharine T. Bartlett, Making Good on Good
Intentions: The Critical Role of Motivation in Reducing Implicit Workplace
Discrimination, 95 VA. L. REV. 1893 (2009) (arguing that it may be misplaced to
seek a cause of action for implicit bias discrimination because implicit bias is not
readily reachable through legal coercion).
84. The possibility for using implicit bias as social framework evidence was
initially raised by Jerry Kang's & Kristin Lane's joint observation that "[ilf general
psychological discoveries about gender discrimination can be admitted as social
framework evidence in Price Waterhouse, general findings about implicit bias and
its undermining of colorblindness should be similarly admissible. The same
evidentiary standards that admitted the former testimony should admit the latter."
Kang & Lane, supra note 81, at 494-95 (2010); see also Jerry Kang, et al., Implicit
Bias in the Courtroom, 59 UCLA L. REV. 1124, 1153-54 n.118 (2012) (suggesting
that lawyers use an expert witness to provide social framework evidence that
identifies particular attributes that exacerbate biased decisionmaking in the
workplace, and then immediately call another witness who is familiar with the
defendant's work environment to ask that witness whether each of those particular
bias-exacerbating attributes exists).
85. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2554 (2011).
86. See FED. R. EVID. 702 (authorizing the use of expert witnesses with
specialized knowledge to "help the trier of fact to understand the evidence"); see
also JOHN WILLIAM STRONG, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 12 at 50 (1992) (stating
that the Federal Rules of Evidence do not "permit opinion on law except questions
of foreign law"); CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, 3 FEDERAL
EVIDENCE § 7:12 (4th ed.) (describing how in practice when "parties offer expert
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proposing that defendants be specifically "tested" for implicit bias
regarding their propensity to discriminate." In fact, the static
focus on an employer's individual IAT results at a specific moment
in time does not address this Article's broader concern for using
the science of implicit bias to construct a more expansive framing
for the ubiquity of racial stereotypes, and how they can be infused
in even the most race-neutral-seeming workplaces. In other
words, more important than any individual employer's IAT results
is a societal narrative of discrimination that can assist fact finders
to identify the contexts that give rise to discrimination. While the
Supreme Court has yet to directly address the issue of implicit
bias in employment discrimination, some courts in the United
States have already begun to rely upon the social science of
implicit bias for assessing the facts in a case in both disparate
treatment and disparate impact cases in ways that can be viewed
as the foundation for beginning to address the reticence of judges
and employment discrimination lawyers to introducing detailed
implicit bias research.88
III. The Current Case Law Receptivity to Implicit Bias
Social Framework Evidence
As early as 1999 (just four years after the publication of
Linda Hamilton Krieger's seminal article "The Content of Our
Categories: A Cognitive Bias Approach to Discrimination and
Equal Employment Opportunity""), the First and Eleventh
Circuits recognized the legal relevance of implicit bias in
employment discrimination cases.
testimony on the content of law during the ordinary course of trial, it is properly
rejected").
87. Jerry Kang, The Missing Quadrants of Antidiscrimination: Going Beyond
the "Prejudice Polygraph," 68 J. Soc. ISSUES 314 (2012) (noting that the focus on
admitting individual IAT scores as pseudo prejudice polygraphs is much too narrow
and obscures the broader range of potential legal responses to the development of
the science of Implicit Social Cognition); Allan G. King & Syeeda S. Amin, The
Propensity to Stereotype as Inadmissible "Character" Evidence, 27 A.B.A. J. LAB. &
EMP. L. 23, 37 (2011) (objecting to the possibility of administering implicit
association tests on defendant employers to show that decision-makers acted in
conformity with their implicit bias).
88. See, e.g., Thomas v. Eastman Kodak Co., 183 F.3d 38, 61 (1st Cir. 1999).
89. Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Content of Our Categories: A Cognitive Bias
Approach to Discrimination and Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REV.
1161 (1995).
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A. Early Judicial Recognition of the Implicit Bias Concept
In Thomas v. Eastman Kodak Co., the First Circuit factored
in concerns with unconscious bias in its analysis of the
discrimination allegations." In the case, Myrtle Thomas, the
plaintiff, was the only Black Customer Service Representative
(CSR) in Eastman Kodak's Wellesley, Massachusetts office, and in
1993 she was terminated." Thomas alleged that Kodak's layoff
decision was discriminatory because it resulted from a ranking
process that relied on racially biased performance appraisals
prepared in 1990, 1991, and 1992. "2 Before Thomas was laid off,
she received very positive performance reviews from her
employer.9 3  In 1989, when a Customer Service Management
position opened up, she applied for the position but was told that
she was unqualified.9 4  Instead, the position went to Claire
Flannery, a former CSR who had been working as a division
secretary.9" The appointment of Flannery "marked a significant
downturn in Thomas's fortunes at Kodak."" According to Thomas,
Flannery treated her differently from other CSRs (e.g., never
accompanied her to customer meetings), gave her bad performance
reviews, and consistently discouraged her from applying for other
leadership positions within the company.
In January 1993, Kodak decided to reduce the number of
employees in its Office Imaging Division. It selected
employees for layoff using a 'Performance Appraisal Ranking
Process' ('PAR process'), which produced a numerical score for
each employee by adding together the employee's overall
performance appraisal score for each of the three preceding
years, after weighting the most recent score by a factor of 25
and the second most recent score by a factor of 5.9"
Since Thomas began receiving negative performance reviews
from Flannery, she had a low PAR score and was laid off.99 Four
months later, Thomas sued Kodak, claiming that its 1993 decision
to terminate her "was discriminatory because it was based on
90. 183 F.3d at 61 ("The concept of 'stereotyping' includes not only simple
beliefs such as 'women are not aggressive' but also a host of more subtle cognitive
phenomena which can skew perceptions and judgments.").
91. Id. at 42.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 43.
94. Id. at 44.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 45.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 46.
99. Id.
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discriminatory performance appraisals conducted by Flannery
from 1990 through 1992."'Oo
The court discussed unconscious bias and stated that Title
VII case law recognizes the "validity of claims based on employers'
biased or stereotypical thinking."'o' The court found that Thomas
had sufficiently demonstrated that Flannery did treat Thomas
differently from other employees and that it was likely due to
Flannery's racial bias against Thomas even if it was a "less
conscious bias."'" For instance, Thomas presented evidence that
even Flannery's assessments of the objective quantity of machines
and installations that Thomas was responsible for were seemingly
tainted by her race-based views of Thomas. 0' Flannery accorded
Thomas a "below average score" of 3 "for managing 730 machines
and 110 installations," while a co-worker received the much higher
score of 5 for managing far "fewer machines (504) and fewer
installations (81)."" In the absence of any evidence that Flannery
was mentally imbalanced or otherwise ill-equipped to judge the
difference between large and small quantities of work product,
there is no race-neutral logical explanation for her disparity in
employee evaluations across race. It is only with the court's
intuitive use of an implicit-bias-informed social framework that
any coherent rationale can be distilled from the divergence
between objectively measured above-average work product and a
below-average evaluation.
The implicit bias research the court references is what
connects the unexplained irrationality of disparity in evaluations
with the recognition of racial discrimination. 0' Specifically, when
even the objective quantification of work product is subject to
widely divergent assessments depending on the race of the
employee, the implicit-bias-informed social framework helps
explain the unexplainable. Similarly, Flannery's refusal to
provide Thomas with computer training, appropriate
developmental opportunities, and the ability to be evaluated based
upon observed interactions with customers, as Flannery did with
other employees, only begins to make sense when analyzed within
the implicit bias-informed social framework, given the absence of
100. Id.
101. Id. at 60 n.14.
102. Id. at 64.
103. Id. at 45-46, 62-63.
104. Id. at 62-63.
105. Id. at 61.
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any proffered business justification.'0 This is why the court
concluded:
It also appears, from the picture that Thomas paints (and
which Kodak does not dispute) that Flannery was at times
inappropriately upset or angry with Thomas, to the point of
behaving unprofessionally. This, in turn, suggests that she
did not respond neutrally to Thomas. A jury might reasonably
infer from Thomas's description of these incidents that
Thomas's race was an issue for Flannery and that Flannery's
evaluations of Thomas were affected by some form of conscious
animus or less conscious bias ....
Given this, it is reasonable to infer that race played a
determinative role in the evaluation process-especially since
there is also other evidence that Flannery treated Thomas
poorly. Indeed, the very fact that Thomas was the only Black
CSR at the Wellesley office may have increased the likelihood
that she would be evaluated more harshly. 107
Similarly, the Eleventh Circuit, in In re Employment
Discrimination Litigation v. Alabama,'" validated the doctrinal
value in considering unconscious bias. In the case, a group of
African American plaintiffs brought claims against the State of
Alabama for race discrimination in employment. 109 In the court's
discussion of disparate impact, the court stated that "the disparate
impact analysis was designed as a 'prophylactic' measure ... to get
at '[d]iscrimination [that] could actually exist under the guise of
compliance with [Title VII]."'o The court reasoned that the
disparate impact analysis was created to help weed out
discrimination that is hidden, including unconscious bias, by
allowing a plaintiff to bring discrimination lawsuits against an
employer by demonstrating that its business practices produced a
disparate impact on minority groups without needing to prove the
subjective intent of the employer, because "even if one assumed
that [discrimination through subjective employment criteria] can
be adequately policed through disparate treatment analysis, the
problem of subconscious stereotypes and prejudices would
remain.""'
Furthermore, at least one court has allowed testimony
about implicit bias even in the absence of an expert witness. In
106. Id. at 63.
107. Id. at 64-65 (citing Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 235-36
(1989)) (emphasis added).
108. 198 F.3d 1305, 1321-22 (11th Cir. 1999).
109. Id. at 1308-09.
110. Id. at 1321 (quoting Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 435 (1971)).
111. Id. at 1321 (quoting Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 990
(1988)) (emphasis added).
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Prue v. University of Washington, Mr. Prue, an African American,
"brought claims against the University of Washington for
discriminating against. . . him on the basis of race and age by
refusing" to consider him "for an Administrative Coordinator
position and then referring him only to manual labor positions."1 2
Mr. Prue had a Master's Degree in Education Administration and
Supervision and had spent twenty-five years providing "support to
doctors, professors, students and staff in university and hospital
settings."H'
In September 2005, when the employer interviewed him for a
temporary position in the School's Department of Medical
Education, the interview was brief."4 The employer claimed that
this was because Mr. Prue did not seem interested in the
position. 5 The next day a White man was hired for the position. 116
Mr. Prue reported his dissatisfaction with the five-minute
interview and the interviewer's statement that the position "was
not for you" to the Vice President of Human Resources.11' During
the employment discrimination litigation, Mr. Prue sought to
explain how the cursory treatment he received was informed by
implicit racial bias.""
The employer moved to exclude testimony and questions
regarding 'implicit bias' and 'stereotyping' that plaintiffs counsel
asked defendants' witnesses about during their depositions."' The
employer objected on the basis that there would be no expert
testimony to explain what "implicit bias" meant."0 However, the
court concluded that "the term 'bias' and the issue of stereotyping
are within the understanding of a typical juror,""' and that "[i]f
the witnesses questioned about the topics do not understand the
112. Plaintiffs Trial Brief at 1, Prue v. Univ. of Wash., No. C07-1859RSL, 2009
WL 1899478 (W.D. Wash. May 27, 2009).
113. Id.
114. Id. at 2.
115. Id. at 7.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 3 ("Mr. Prue contacted the University Complaint Investigation and
Resolution Office (UCIRO) to report race and age discrimination on September 28,
2005.").
118. Id. at 3-4.
119. Prue v. Univ. of Wash., No. C07-1859RSL, 2009 WL 1174455, at *3 (W.D.
Wash. Apr. 29, 2009).
120. Id.
121. Id.
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terms, they [could] so state.... Accordingly, using the terms
[would] not unduly confuse the jury."2 2
Most recently, the 2010 case of Kimble v. Wisconsin
Department of Workforce Development provided the most
comprehensive detail about the role of implicit bias in the
employer's act of discrimination.12 3 Kimble was a case in which an
African American male employee alleged that he had been denied
pay raises because of his supervisor's racist decision-making. 2 1
The judge evaluating the case concluded that the supervisor's
highly subjective evaluation process for employees was
questionable because of the many contradictions that other
witness testimony revealed. 12' The judge stated in the opinion that
"when the evaluation of employees is highly subjective, there is a
risk that supervisors will make judgments based on stereotypes of
which they may or may not be entirely aware."" The judge then
specifically referred to the literature regarding implicit bias, the
supervisor's absence of written criteria for conducting consistent
and fair employee evaluations, the failure to consult the
employees' immediate supervisors for performance reviews, and
the failure to have the compensation award decisions subject to
meaningful review, as evidence of the subjective evaluation
process prone to implicit bias.'2  Particularly noteworthy is how
the judge detected that the supervisor regarded the plaintiff
through his implicit biases "as if he were veiled with images of
incompetency," inasmuch as the supervisor was often quick to
blame the plaintiff for workplace failings before discovering all the
facts, while at the same time overlooking the faults of other
employees who were not Black males.2s
Judges can become so engaged with the social science of
implicit bias that they will even provide litigants a blueprint for
submitting such information. In Thomas v. Troy City Board of
Education, an Alabama District Court Judge found that, despite
the fact that the employer had articulated a legitimate
122. Id. Yet, it may very well be that the absence of an expert witness who could
elaborate on the significance of implicit bias and its scientific validity influenced
the jury's verdict in favor of the defendant employer.
123. 690 F. Supp. 2d 765 (E.D. Wis. 2010).
124. Id.
125. Id. at 772.
126. Id. at 775-76 (emphasis added).
127. Id. at 776.
128. Id. at 776-77 (quoting Floyd D. Weatherspoon, Remedying Employment
Discrimination Against African-American Males: Stereotypical Biases Engender a
Case of Race Plus Sex Discrimination, 36 WASHBURN L.J. 23, 41 (1996)).
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nondiscriminatory reason for preferring a White candidate who
had the desired experience and enhanced educational level that
the African American plaintiff Mr. Thomas lacked, "[this did] not
necessarily mean that no discrimination occurred in the selection
process."" The court went on to explain how, despite the fact that
the defendant employer had successfully disputed the allegation of
discrimination with its proffer that it chose the candidate it
perceived to be the most qualified for the job, it was still possible
that "Thomas was subjected to discrimination [because] ... [such
subjective decision-making processes are particularly susceptible
to being influenced not by overt bigotry and hatred, but rather by
unexamined assumptions about others that the decisionmaker
may not even be aware of . . . .""0 After noting that the court had
not been provided with any evidence that the employer's decisions
had been shaped by unconscious racial stereotypes as detailed in
the legal scholarship that the judge liberally quoted from Charles
Lawrence III, the judge admonished the employer to take into
account the operation of unconscious bias when making all future
hiring decisions.13' Thus, despite the fact that the plaintiff in the
case had no evidence that the employer's proffered
nondiscriminatory reason was a mere pretext, and the plaintiff
had not raised or litigated the issue of unconscious bias, the Troy
court still provided all future litigants with a blueprint of how to
raise it in their complaints and which sources to reference.
B. Judicial Resistance to the Implicit Bias Concept
Of course, there are also cases that have expressed resistance
to the consideration of implicit bias social framework data. An
examination of such cases offers up guidance about how to
mitigate the judicial resistance. Namely, the cases suggest that
greater detail about the science of implicit bias should be offered.
Merely referencing of the general idea of implicit bias is not
automatically persuasive.
For instance, in Burrell v. County of Santa Clara, the
plaintiffs, three African American females, brought disparate
impact claims against the County of Santa Clara Health
Department for denying all of them promotions based upon their
129. Thomas v. Troy City Bd. of Educ., 302 F. Supp. 2d 1303, 1309 (M.D. Ala.
2004).
130. Id.
131. Id. at 1309-10.
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racial backgrounds and other factors.132  However, each of the
plaintiffs failed to submit any statistical evidence of disparate
impact within the company. 33 They simply stated that "'[blased on
the implicit bias test studies, there are few groups of employees as
impacted by the glass ceilings as much as African Americans. '"
In response, the court noted that "[t]estimony about the general
challenges faced by a minority group, without more, does not
constitute evidence that any particular employer's practices had a
disparate impact on that group."
Going into greater depth about the science of implicit bias not
only provides greater clarity regarding its relevance to the
analysis of a particular allegation of discrimination, but also
provides the opportunity to possibly win over judicial skeptics.
When judges and other legal actors are exposed to the literature
regarding implicit associations, the results can be quite
transformative.
One such skeptic was Judge Mark Bennett, a nineteen-year
veteran of the federal court in the Northern District of Iowa. 13
But once he was provided with the substantive details about the
science of implicit bias, he became committed to supporting its
consideration in the legal profession. 3 7  His own account of his
conversion to becoming a supporter of legal considerations of
implicit bias is as follows:
My own introduction to implicit bias was deeply unnerving.
Associate Dean Russ Lovell of the Drake University Law
School, with whom I have co-taught Advanced Employment
Discrimination Litigation for many years, suggested that I
visit a Harvard University website about Project Implicit. The
site, www.implicit.harvard.edu, includes an online test on
different types of biases called the Implicit Association Test
(IAT). At that time, I knew nothing about the IAT, but as a
former civil rights lawyer and seasoned federal district court
judge-one with a lifelong commitment to egalitarian and
anti-discrimination values-I was eager to take the test. I
knew I would "pass" with flying colors. I didn't.
132. Burrell v. Cnty. of Santa Clara, No. 11-CV-04569-LHK, 2013 WL 2156374,
at *15, *29, *35 (N.D. Cal. May 17, 2013).
133. Id. at *34.
134. Id. at *25.
135. Id.
136. The Honorable Judge Mark W. Bennett Biography, Judges Information,
U.S. DIST. CT. N.D. IOWA, http://www.iand.uscourts.gov/e-
web/home.nsf/0/17a5762715fa4c52862573c90079072c (last visited Feb. 10, 2014);
see Judge Mark W. Bennett, Unraveling the Gordian Knot of Implicit Bias in Jury
Selection: The Problems of Judge-Dominated Voir Dire, The Failed Promise of
Batson, and Proposed Solutions, 4 HARV. L. & POL'Y REV. 149, 149 (2010).
137. Bennett, supra note 136, at 149-50.
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Strongly sensing that my test performance must be due to
the quackery of this obviously invalid test, I set out to learn as
much as I could about both the IAT and what it purported to
measure: implicit bias. After much research, I ultimately
realized that the problem of implicit bias is a little recognized
and even less addressed flaw in our legal system, particularly
in our jury system. I have discovered that we unconsciously
act on implicit biases even though we abhor them when they
come to our attention. Implicit biases cause subtle
actions,... [blut they are also powerful and pervasive enough
to affect decisions about whom we employ, whom we leave on
juries, and whom we believe. Jurors, lawyers, and judges do
not leave behind their implicit biases when they walk through
the courthouse doors. 13
As a result of his exposure to the science of implicit bias,
Judge Bennett now includes "a slide about implicit bias in the
PowerPoint presentation that [he] show [s] before allowing
attorneys to question potential jurors" in all cases."9 He also
suggests that jury instructions include a brief discussion of
implicit bias and then urge jurors to attempt to be aware of them
and thereby control them. 140
It is not only skeptics of the IAT that will need to be
persuaded, but also judges who are convinced of the relevance of
the IAT but are concerned that incorporating empirical data about
implicit bias will inadvertently diminish the capacity of civil rights
doctrine to redress the harms of discrimination. Legal scholars
Ralph Richard Banks and Richard Thompson Ford have detailed
many of these concerns about the turn to implicit bias research
weakening antidiscrimination doctrine.14 ' Banks and Ford are
particularly concerned that the rhetoric of unconscious bias is so
compelling that it will transfigure the goal of antidiscrimination
doctrine away from the practicalities of addressing substantive
inequality and instead focus on the utopian and amorphous goal of
eradicating unconscious bias.'42 This is worrisome to Banks and
Ford because it reinforces a misguided preoccupation with
138. Id.
139. Id. at 169.
140. Id.
141. Ralph Richard Banks & Richard Thompson Ford, (How) Does Unconscious
Bias Matter?: Law, Politics, and Racial Inequality, 58 EMORY L.J. 1053 (2009); see
also Perry L. Moriearty, Framing Justice: Media, Bias, and Legal Decisionmaking,
69 MD. L. REV. 849, 907 (2010) (observing that "[i]n some respects, Banks, Ford and
Johnson are right. Addressing the cognitive pathologies that contribute to biased
decisionmaking cannot be the sole objective of antidiscrimination efforts. The
problem is that unless these pathologies are accounted for and surmounted, the
broader structural reforms they seek . . . may never .. . get off the ground.").
142. Banks & Ford, supra note 141 at 1110.
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individual mindsets rather than an assessment of unequal status,
access, and evaluation, which are the substance of inequality in
the workplace.1 4 3 To be sure, if Banks's and Ford's predictions
about unconscious bias discourse diverting antidiscrimination
doctrine away from measurable equality goals like integration,
reparations, or equal outcomes, were to come to pass, the goal of
racial justice would indeed be in peril. 144
Outside of the employment discrimination context, the
judicial discussion of implicit bias has varied from being the model
of metaphorical glue for appropriately identifying discrimination,
to being fraught with problems that resonate with Banks's and
Ford's concerns with racial justice. A review of those cases
suggests that with concrete guidance courts can be amenable to
the appropriate admission of implicit bias research.
C. The Treatment of Implicit Bias in Other Legal Contexts
Before the development of the IAT, the existence of
unconscious biases was already being acknowledged in certain
areas of law, such as jury selection and questions regarding the
constitutionality of officer arrests.14 5 But with the proliferation of
implicit bias research, the term "implicit bias" has found its way
into other areas of law.
State v. Sherman presents a case of considering the role of
implicit bias in criminal sentencing." The Ohio Court of Appeals
143. Id. at 1110-16.
144. Nevertheless, Jerry Kang provides a useful response to Banks's and Ford's
concerns when he notes, "[tihis is not to say that the social cognitive model [of
implicit bias research] explains nothing. It explains a great deal, and most
importantly, provides the most potent response to the presumption that we are all
already colorblind. .... It might be distracting attention and resources from to
other methodologies.. .. [But] [o]ne way to gauge the worth of the investment is to
see how much more the science (as compared to other forms of progressive
discourse) upsets the Right." Jerry Kang, Implicit Bias and the Pushback from the
Left, 54 ST. Louis U. L.J. 1139, 1148-49 (2010); see also John Powell & Rachel
Godsil, Implicit Bias Insights as Preconditions to Structural Change, POVERTY &
RACE (Poverty & Race Res. Council), SeptJOct. 2011, available at
http://www.prrac.org/full text.php?text id=1363&item id=13241&newsletter id=1
19&header=Race+%2F+Racism&kc=1 (critiquing Banks & Ford for overlooking
how "implicit bias insights are crucial to addressing the substantive inequalities
that result from structural racialization" and how the implicit bias research is
deeply engaged in studying the connection between the individual and society).
145. See Eva Paterson, Kimberly Thomas Rapp & Sara Jackson, The Id, the Ego,
and Equal Protection in the 21st Century: Building upon Charles Lawrence's Vision
to Mount a Contemporary Challenge to the Intent Doctrine, 40 CONN. L. REV. 1175,
1191-94 (2008).
146. State v. Sherman, No. 97840, 2012 WL 3765041 (Ohio Ct. App. Aug. 30,
2012).
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vacated a trial sentence of six months for a White defendant that
was vastly disproportionate to the seven year prison term for a
similarly situated non-White defendant.'47  In a concurring
opinion, Judge Stewart invoked implicit bias as a possible
explanation for the disparity in sentencing, and identified studies
that question "whether unconscious or hidden bias may lead to
harsher criminal penalties for certain offenders, despite the
judges' professional commitment to sentence proportionality."'4
The court held that "the large discrepancy in sentences
between similarly situated defendants" compelled the court to
vacate the defendant's sentence and remand the case for
resentencing.'4 1 In her concurrence, Judge Stewart discussed the
role that implicit bias may have played in the matter."' The judge
discussed the nature of implicit bias and cited to numerous law
review articles on the topic in addition to those articles specifically
pertaining to the implicit bias of judges."' The judge then
specifically noted that "the disparity in sentencing of these
individuals who are so similarly situated, save race or ethnicity, at
least requires consideration of what impact unconscious
preferences or biases may have played in the disparity" and
warrants vacating the sentence and remanding for sentencing
"blecause there is no 'cure' for completely ridding ourselves of
these hidden influences, an appreciation for their existence and an
awareness of how they impact decision making will go a long way
in helping to improve our justice system."152
Similarly, in United States v. Vandebrake," a federal judge
referred to his concern about the effect of implicit bias in his
explanation of his departure from the federal sentencing
guidelines. The judge rejected, on policy grounds, the relatively
lenient treatment of antitrust violators in the Sentencing
Guidelines, as compared to defendants sentenced for fraud, and
imposed a sentence on an antitrust defendant of forty-eight
months, rather than a sentence in the guidelines range of twenty-
one to twenty-seven months. " The judge specifically opined on
the social forces behind the lenient treatment of antitrust
violators:
147. Id. at IT 10, 11, 40.
148. Id. at 48 (Steward, P.J., concurring).
149. Id. at 1 39-40.
150. Id. at 1 49 (Steward, P.J., concurring).
151. Id. at 11 44-49.
152. Id. at $1 49-50.
153. 771 F. Supp. 2d 961 (N.D. Iowa 2011).
154. Id. at 999-1005, 1012.
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One cannot help but wonder why sentences under the
Sherman Act are so low. Is it the result of be [sic] explicit
and/or implicit bias on behalf of Congress? The captains of
American industry at the time of the Sherman Act's passage
in 1890, and the most likely targets of prosecution under the
Sherman Act, were the likes of J.P. Morgan, John D.
Rockefeller, Andrew Carnegie, and Meyer Guggenheim. These
individuals were almost exclusively wealthy, White, Anglo-
Saxon, protestant males who were politically well-connected.
Although the demographics of American industry have
changed since 1890, the overly lenient sentencing (in my view)
for white collar, antitrust criminals found in the origins of the
Sherman Act lingers today in the United States Sentencing
Commission Guidelines. 5 "
In United States v. Smith, the court held that the defendant
was permitted to offer expert testimony on eyewitness
identification, specifically, cross-racial identification that can be
impaired by implicit bias. 156 The testimony did not run afoul of
Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence because it was reliable
and assisted the jury in reaching a fair determination as to the
witnesses' credibility. 7  Furthermore, the testimony did not
violate Rule 403 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, because the
probative value of the testimony was not outweighed by danger of
unfair prejudice. 8
The issue of cross-racial identification arose within the
context of a criminal trial where the jury found the defendant
guilty only of bank robbery and illegally possessing a firearm."
At trial, the prosecution's strongest evidence proffered were "two
eyewitness identifications by individuals who had little contact
with [the defendant]."60 One of the eyewitnesses was White, and
the defendant was Black.161
The defendant offered expert testimony from Dr. Sol Fulero,
a professor who has written extensively on the topic of eyewitness
identification.'62 The purpose of Fulero's testimony was to supply
jurors with information on specific factors that impact witness
accuracy, most importantly, information showing that cross-racial
eyewitness identifications are less accurate than same-race
155. Id. at 1002-03 (emphasis added).
156. 621 F. Supp. 2d 1207, 1212-21 (M.D. Ala. 2009).
157. Id. at 1212-19.
158. Id. at 1219-21.
159. Id. at 1209.
160. Id. at 1214-15.
161. Id. at 1215.
162. Id. at 1213.
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identifications.' 6  The prosecution moved to exclude Fulero's
testimony, relying on Rules 702 and 403 of the Federal Rules of
Evidence.'" The court allowed Fulero to give his opinion about the
science of eyewitness identifications because it satisfied the
Daubert test as reliable scientific knowledge that would aid the
jury. 6' After concluding that Fulero's methods satisfied the
reliability prong, the court discussed at length the importance of
his research in informing the jury's deliberations. 6 6
In concluding that the expert testimony on cross-racial
identification was reliable and admissible, the court cited to
authorities that have incorporated the research on implicit bias.17
The expert testimony led to the conclusion that eyewitness
testimony might be impaired by subconscious biases where the
events involve members of a different race."8 The court held that
this information properly aided the jury in reaching a fair and
accurate conclusion, because it allowed for "better understandings
of human decisionmaking, including the flaws, weaknesses, and
biases that characterize human life." 16
The court also rejected the prosecution's argument under
Rule 403 that Fulero's testimony would confuse and mislead jurors
about their role as the ultimate arbiters of eyewitnesses. 7 0 On the
contrary, the court found the testimony to be probative, given that
it constituted "scientifically robust evidence that seeks to correct
misguided intuitions and thereby prevent jurors from making
common errors in judgment simply by giving them more accurate
information about issues directly relevant to the case." 7'
The court concluded that the testimony on cross-racial
eyewitness identification allowed the jury to interpret the evidence
in a way that was "more fully developed and reliable than it would
otherwise have been."17' As a result, the defendant received a
fairer trial, and "the jury, the court, and the entire judicial system
can rest much more comfortably that [the defendant's] robbery
conviction is a reliable outcome because the conviction is much less
163. Id. at 1215-16.
164. Id. at 1209.
165. Id. at 1211-19.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 1215-16.
168. Id. at 1215-19.
169. Id. at 1219.
170. Id. at 1219-21.
171. Id. at 1221.
172. Id. at 1222.
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likely to have been infected by the flaws uncovered by recent
empirical studies on eyewitness-identifications.""7
While the aforementioned cases demonstrate a judicial
willingness to consider implicit bias research, there are also
instances of a judicial refusal to consider it. Often judicial refusal
is rooted in a fundamental concern with the mechanics of how to
properly consider implicit bias research. The case of State v.
Martin is an example of those judicial tensions."' In Martin, a
case alleging prosecutorial bias, the court held that it is not
required to look to implicit bias in deciding Batson challenges to
the prosecution's exercise of peremptory juror strikes.17 5
On an appeal from a conviction for first-degree premeditated
murder, the defendant argued that the district court should be
alert for a prosecutor's subconscious, implicit bias, in addition to
the more obvious and explicit purposeful discrimination in the
exercise of peremptory strikes.1 7 6  The court soundly rejected
admission of that theory: "Martin does not cite to any cases that
support his argument that the district court should look to
implicit, in addition to explicit, bias in Batson challenges, nor does
he detail how a court should investigate implicit bias.""' The court
then held that the defendant failed to carry his burden of proving
purposeful discrimination and thus held that the findings of the
lower court were not clearly erroneous.1
State v. Martin thus suggests that in order for the proffer of
implicit bias research to be broadly considered by judges, concrete
guidance about how this research should be deployed will be
necessary for persuading some judges to admit it. Judicial
resources such as the National Center for State Courts Implicit
Bias Primer for courts that has been circulated by the American
Bar Association will be particularly useful." Such guidance is
173. Id.
174. 773 N.W.2d 89 (Minn. 2009).
175. To succeed on a Batson challenge,
(1) [T]he defendant must make a prima facie showing that the prosecutor
executed a peremptory challenge on the basis of race; (2) the burden then
shifts to the prosecution to articulate a race-neutral explanation for
striking the juror in question; and (3) the district court must determine
whether the defendant has carried the burden of proving purposeful
discrimination.
Id. at 101 (citing Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 767 (1995)).
176. Id. at 102.
177. Id. (emphasis added).
178. Id. at 104.
179. JERRY KANG, NAT'L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, IMPLICIT BIAS: A PRIMER FOR
COURTS (AUG. 2009), available at
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also necessary because even those judges who are willing to admit
implicit bias research have, at times, misconstrued it in ways that
further racism rather than oppose it. This is because simple
surface discussions of unconscious racism are incorporated at the
same time a court completely overlooks the structures of racism
relevant to the case.
For example, in Chin v. Runnels, a criminal case regarding a
conviction for second-degree murder, the petitioner filed a petition
for a writ of habeas corpus claiming that Chinese Americans,
Filipino Americans, and Hispanic Americans were excluded from
service as forepersons on the grand jury that indicted him, thereby
violating his right to equal protection.'" While the court
recognized that "[tihe complete absence of grand jury forepersons
of Chinese, Filipino or Latino descent over a 36-year period begs
the question whether unconscious stereotyping or biases may have
contributed to the exclusion of these groups notwithstanding the
best intentions of those involved,""' it nevertheless held that it
was entirely reasonable for the state court to rely on the testimony
of individuals who had an inside understanding of the judges'
selection process and concluded that the government rebutted the
petitioner's prima facie case of discrimination. 18 2  Yet this
assessment is based upon an inherently subjective selection
process where judges selected the foreperson after an off-the-
record, in-chambers discussion looking for individuals with
leadership capacity, administrative abilities, and people skills
when making recommendations. 183 In fact, the court noted that
"[a] number of courts have recognized that subjective decision-
making allows for subtle biases or unconscious stereotyping to
affect selection processes"'" and that a growing body of social
science recognizes the pervasiveness of unconscious racial and
ethnic stereotyping and group bias."*
But despite the judicial recognition that the selection process
was susceptible to abuse given that the judge selected the
foreperson after personally observing each prospective juror, and
that the conversations leading to the selections occurred off the
record, the court held that the state court's judgment that the
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/sections/criminaljustice/Pub
licDocuments/unit_3_kang.authcheckdam.pdf.
180. 343 F. Supp. 2d 891, 893 (N.D. Cal. 2004).
181. Id. at 906.
182. Id. at 903
183. Id. at 896.
184. Id. at 906.
185. Id.
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government rebutted the petitioner's prima facie case of
discrimination was not an "'unreasonable determination of the
facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court
proceeding.'""6 While it is true that the appellate review inquiry
into the reasonableness of a lower court's holding is a more
circumscribed inquiry than if the matter had been presented for de
novo review where the court could more closely scrutinize the state
court's findings, it is highly puzzling how the appellate court could
acknowledge all the ways that implicit bias operates in a
problematic fashion while at the same time not connecting it to the
actual facts of the case. It is as if by genuflecting regarding the
topic of unconscious discrimination, cover is provided for being
judicially passive about its effects on equal protection in ways that
undermine the efficacy of antidiscrimination law-the very fear
Banks and Fords raised in their 2009 article." Furthermore, the
few employers that have voluntarily addressed the issue of
implicit bias have done so in ways that parallel some of the
concerns raised by Banks and Ford about the danger of misapplied
uses of implicit bias research.
D. Employer Initiatives for Implicit Bias Reduction Policies
In 2008, Weyerhaeuser, one of the world's largest forest
products companies, publicly stated that it had made the decision
to look into combating unconscious bias within its corporate
walls."8 Yet its articulated concern with implicit bias was
seemingly focused on the feelings of individual employees rather
than measurable outcomes of equal status, access, and treatment.
Effenus Henderson, the company's Chief Diversity Officer
specifically stated, "I think it is important to recognize that bias
exists, and you must coach leaders in a way that will allow them to
recognize it .... This will help them build inclusive behaviors
that help recognize things that exist in all of us that can at times
get in the way of being inclusive and respectful of others."' While
it is certainly worthwhile to encourage corporate leaders to be
inclusive and respectful, substantive equality requires more than a
code of proper workplace etiquette.
186. Id. at 904-05 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2554(d)(2)).
187. Banks & Ford, supra note 141, at 1110.
188. Cook Ross, Inc., Proven Strategies for Addressing Unconscious Bias in the
Workplace, 2 CDO INSIGHTS 12 (Aug. 2008), available at
http://www.cookross.com/docs/LJnconsciousBias.pdf (presenting special case study
on Weyerhaeuser company).
189. Id.
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Similarly, Chubb Insurance has developed bias awareness
training for its management teams as a device for specifically
addressing unconscious bias, along with a dedicated phone line,
called "Voice of the Employee," to provide an open channel of
communication for employees to tackle workplace bias.'" Like
with the Weyerhaeuser goals of inclusion and respect, Chubb's
attempts to alter management's mindsets about the value of their
employees are certainly admirable, yet they misperceive the
substantive equality goals of antidiscrimination doctrine.
Fortunately, there are examples of other employers who
instead respond to the implicit bias research by implementing
concrete practices to pursue substantive equality. For example,
when Home Depot implemented a new employment structure for
an automated hiring and promotion system called Job Preference
Process ("JPP"), discriminatory practices were reduced
significantly. 9' With the JPP, job applications are submitted
through computer or telephone kiosks.'92  It is "an in-store
computer or telephone system that enables employees and
applicants to indicate their job preferences and qualifications, and
thus automatically become part of the pool for any position that
meets those preferences and qualifications."9 The purposes of the
JPP include the following:
(i) to improve the information available to Home Depot's
management in making promotion and employee development
and training decisions; (ii) to provide a systematic Division-
wide method, consistent with equal employment opportunity,
for Home Depot Associates to make informed and documented
decisions about their career preferences; (iii) to provide a
systematic framework within which Home Depot will
incorporate such Associate preferences into its retail store
promotion and Associate development and training decisions;
and (iv) to establish a meaningful basis for setting
Benchmarks .... 4
The JPP program has been successful in pursuing
substantive equality because once a manager posts a job opening,
he or she automatically receives a list of all qualified applicants
190. Id. at 7 (presenting a special case study on Chubb Group of Insurance
Companies).
191. Reskin, supra note 7, at 36.
192. Id.
193. Susan Strum, Second Generation Employment Discrimination: A Structural
Approach, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 458, 512-13 (2001).
194. Consent Decree at 39, Butler v. Home Depot, 984 F. Supp. 1257 (N.D. Cal.
1997) (No. C 94-4335 SI), available at
http://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1005&context=con
dec (emphasis added).
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through the computer's standardized matching process.1 9 5 This
curtails a manager's discretion to hire their friends and
demographically homogeneous circles of contacts and thereby
reduces the likelihood that managers' conscious and unconscious
in-group favoritism will determine their employment decisions. 96
Home Depot is not alone in responding to concerns of
unconscious bias by developing concrete practices for pursuing
substantive equality. Deloitte & Touche, one of the largest
accounting, tax, and management consulting firms in the United
States, develops participatory task forces that assess whether the
assignment process within each of its offices is based on proper
criteria and not on bias, specifically gender-based bias."'
The review of the foregoing case studies suggests that
companies can respond to the insights from implicit bias research
in either cursory or substantive fashions. The shallow use of
implicit bias research that Banks and Ford fear is not preordained.
Nevertheless, those concerned with meaningful equality are well
advised to be vigilant in advancing and supporting implicit bias
research applications that profoundly engage the pursuit of racial
justice. As the scholar who first encouraged us to consider the role
of unconscious discrimination in the enforcement of racial
equality, Charles Lawrence, III has stated that we must challenge
ourselves "to see the cultural meaning that [W]hite supremacy has
constructed, to see it so that we can begin the work of
reconstructing those meanings and our shared
humanity.... [A]nd do this difficult work that will make our
wounded world whole."198
IV. Incorporating Implicit Bias Research Social
Framework Evidence-A Case Example
The proposal for employment discrimination litigants to
begin inserting the details of implicit bias research into social
framework evidence can conceivably be deployed in any number of
ways, depending on the facts of a disparate treatment case or
disparate impact case. Nevertheless, the following sample
application of the proposal is offered with the knowledge that
concrete examples offer the best guidance. In fact, revisiting a
195. Reskin, supra note 7, at 36.
196. Id.
197. Strum, supra note 193, at 492.
198. Charles Lawrence, 1II, Unconscious Racism Revisited: Reflections on the
Impact and Origins of "The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection," 40 CONN. L. REV.
931, 977 (2008).
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previously litigated case provides the opportunity to assess the
potential advantages of the proposal.
In Section III of this Article, Thomas v. Troy City Board of
Education'" was presented as a case where a judge urged the
defendant-employer to consider the importance of implicit bias
even after the defendant successfully disputed the discrimination
allegation with its proffer of a legitimate nondiscriminatory
rationale. It is thus useful to consider the ways implicit bias could
have been invoked by the plaintiff in a way that could have made a
more persuasive case of discrimination by providing a social
framework that enables a fact-finder to readily identify the signs
of discrimination in today's climate of post-racial discourse.
In Thomas, the plaintiff, Willie Thomas, had been an
employee of the Troy City school system for over twenty-five
years.2M For five years he held the position of assistant
superintendent; he also spent nine years employed at the central
office as an administrator. 0  The concern with racial
discrimination arose when Thomas applied for the vacant position
of superintendent. Eighteen individuals applied for the position.
After an initial screening of the applicants' resumes, eight
candidates were deemed qualified for the position (three of whom
were Black), and of those eight, four were selected for interviews
(all of whom were White). 03 Thomas was in the group of eight
candidates who met the qualifications for the position but was
deemed unattractive for interviewing purposes (like the other two
Black candidates).204
The process for selecting whom to interview appeared quite
neutral on its face but was rife with opportunity for the operation
of implicit bias. To select interview candidates, each of the five
board members numerically ranked the applicants. The votes
were then tallied, and interviews were offered to the four
candidates with the highest rankings.205 The five-person voting
board had two Black members, one of whom was the only board
199. 302 F. Supp. 2d 1303 (M.D. Ala. 2004).
200. Id. at 1305.
201. Id.
202. Id. at 1306.
203. Id.
204. This demographic data that was discussed by the parties during the pre-
trial conference was unfortunately not part of the official record, because it was not
submitted to the court in the form of a sworn statement within the court deadline
for summary judgment motions. Id. at 1306 n.2.
205. Id. at 1306.
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member who ranked Thomas in the top four candidates, 206 despite
Thomas' twenty-five years of administrative experience with the
city school system, a master's degree, and course work towards his
doctorate degree.207 While the degree of subjectivity in the process,
and the resulting demographically skewed results, suggest a
context highly susceptible to the operation of implicit bias,
presenting an implicit bias research social framework would have
assisted the fact-finder in identifying how the very parameters for
decision-making were themselves influenced by racial stereotypes,
despite the absence of any overtly racialized remarks on the part
of the decision-makers.
Specifically, the main articulated criterion for choosing the
new superintendent was "the ability to improve academics in Troy
City Schools ... [and] an emphasis on academic programs and the
ability to understand and structure academic programs."2 " On its
face, the employer's stated criterion appears to be
nondiscriminatory, despite the racially skewed results it produced
in a racially diverse jurisdiction like Alabama. Furthermore, in
the contemporary social context in which post-racial rhetoric
questioning the continued existence of racism is pervasive, a fact
finder might find it difficult to understand how seemingly race-
neutral selection criteria can yield racially skewed results.
In contrast, providing a social framework with detailed
implicit bias research would provide the fact finder with a vehicle
for better understanding how facial race neutrality can yield racial
disparity. This would entail: 1) a summary of what scientific
research now shows us about how the brain cognitively functions
and often operates on auto pilot by relying upon culturally learned
implicit biases to make assessments; 2) an explanation of the IAT
and how it measures the strength of implicit biases; and 3) a
description of the IAT research studies demonstrating the
pervasiveness of racial implicit bias and its effect on decision-
making, as shown in resume studies and other studies described in
Section II of this Article.
With the proffer of the implicit bias testing research social
framework, the fact-finder in Thomas would have been able to
assess the facts with a heightened attention to the ways in which
culturally pervasive implicit biases could have influenced the
subjective decision-making of the employer. Thus, when viewing
the Thomas facts through the social science lens of implicit bias,
206. Id.
207. Id. at 1307-08.
208. Id.
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the longstanding racial stereotypes about the intellectual
inferiority of Blacks are salient (even though never voiced by the
employer), and they elucidate how a Black man with a master's
degree, twenty-five years of administering federal programs for
the school district, and five years' experience as assistant
superintendent was deemed ill-suited to understanding and
structuring academic programs. While the White candidate who
was chosen did have academic experience as a teacher, and then
as a principal of an elementary school, an objective comparison
informed by the implicit bias research suggests that more simple
elementary school instruction pales in comparison to Thomas'
actual experience as assistant superintendent and administrator.
An implicit bias testing research social framework would also
have been useful in contextualizing the spurious allegations that
were made about the plaintiffs credit history. Specifically, during
the school board's deliberations, an unsubstantiated accusation of
having an unsatisfactory credit rating was raised and viewed as
pertinent because "one of the main responsibilities of a
superintendent is 'that he's the chief fiscal officer for the school
system and has to enure [sic] that money is managed in an
efficient and effective manner.' Therefore, consideration of
Thomas's credit history, even if the history was inaccurate, is a
legitimate consideration."209 In contrast, an implicit bias research
social framework lens could have provided the backdrop for then
introducing how the unstated racial stereotype about Blacks as
irresponsible with money and other matters explains the alleged
relevance of the unsupported accusations of financial
mismanagement. This is because the implicit bias research social
framework contextualizes how employers can inappropriately
draw negative inferences from specious and unsubstantiated
accusations when such accusations conform to culturally
entrenched biases.
In short, without an implicit bias research social framework,
plaintiffs like Thomas are left struggling to explain the
unexplainable-the existence of racially distinctive treatment
without any overt employer references to race-based justifications
or stereotypes. With an implicit bias research social framework, a
fact-finder has a lens for identifying how, even in the absence of
racially biased or stereotyped employer statements, racially
differentiated treatment can be explained by socially pervasive
implicit bias. While the contemporary presumptions about a
209. Id. at 1308.
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presumably "post-racial" society will continue to present
challenges to litigators attempting to explain the significance of
racial disparity in the absence of an overt Jim Crow segregation
mandate, this Article offers the implicit bias testing research
social framework as one mechanism for assisting fact finders in
recognizing the harms of racial discrimination.

